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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D. 
H. WHITTENBTTRG, Chairman, H. 
J. CORLEISSEN and L A Y T O N 
MAXFIELD, Members of the Engin-
eering Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES D. 
WIMAN, Trustees under the Will and 
of the Estate of C H A R L E S H. 
DEERE, Deceased, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Chapter 13, First Special Session, Laws of Utah 
1951, became effective June 18th of that year. (Session 
Laws, p. 17.) By that Act plaintiff was required "forth-
with" to condemn for State Park purposes a large tract 
of land specifically described by metes and bounds. (Act, 
1 
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Sec. 8a.) Pursuant thereto on July 10, 1951 the Engin-
eering Commission passed a "Condemnation Resolution" 
(R. 5) and immediately thereafter filed its complaint in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County. (Case No. 92516.) 
This complaint contains the usual averments to 
support the prayer for condemnation, sets forth the in-
terests which the various defendants may have or claim, 
and then ipsa dixit allocates the land to be condemned 
and the interests of the various defendants into twenty-
eight "parcels" and two additional "outstanding inter-
ests". (R. 1-20.) Twenty-seven of these "parcels" con-
sist of described tracts owned by named defendants other 
than the appellants. (R. 6-15.) "Parcel 28" is then in 
effect described as the entire property exactly as set out 
in the legislative mandate, less the twenty-seven other 
described parcels and some other interests for unassigned 
reasons also excluded. (R. 15-17.) 
The tract which the Utah Legislature at its special 
session commanded plaintiff "to forthwith condemn" is 
an area of several square miles located at the mouth of 
Emigration Canyon east of Salt Lake City. I t includes 
130.23 acres of a total of approximately 215.73 acres 
owned by these particular defendants and appellants in 
the general vicinity; the Je r ry Jones tract of 5.7 acres; 
the Tedesco tract of 6.46 acres; the Wheelwright tract 
of 9.41 acres; twenty-six individual subdivided residen-
tial lots comprising a total of some 8 acres owned by 
various defendants, on some of which homes were in 
various stages of construction; and 7.66 acres of dedi-
cated streets other than the State Highway through 
2 
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Emigration Canyon with its branch to the adjacent 
Monument and the main County Road leading to the 
south. The area was in various stages of development 
from bare mountainside to completed residences in 
platted and restricted subdivisions wherein were in place 
dedicated streets, curb and gutter, drainage facilities, 
fire hydrants and the usual utilities of water, power, 
telephone and gas. (R. Ex. 1, p. 154.) 
Because of the large extent of the area involving 
numerous defendants and interests, pursuant to Section 
104-35-6 of the Judicial Code and Rule 42(b) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure plaintiff asked the court in its dis-
cretion to sever issues pertaining to these particular 
defendants (R. 51); and the court so ordered (R. 51, 82). 
It was also ordered pursuant to stipulation that a sepa-
rate record in this case should be maintained pertaining 
to these parties only (R. 89-90), hereinafter referred to 
as the "plaintiff" and the "Deere Estate" or "defend-
ants". 
In addition to the usual prayer for condemnation 
the complaint prayed for an order of immediate occu-
pancy "for the purpose of commencing such construction 
and improvement of a State Park." (R. 19.) However, 
the Legislature had enacted no plans for such construc-
tion and improvement beyond the bare condemnation 
mandate, and this motion was not pressed but in fact 
wTas resisted by plaintiff. (R. 82.) Summons was served 
on July 12, 1951, whereupon there became applicable the 
provisions of Section 104-34-11 of the Judicial Code, 
which reads as follows: 
3 
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104-34-11. When Right to Damages Deemed to 
Have Accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation 
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the service of sum-
mons, and its actual value at that date shall be 
the measure of compensation for all property to 
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to 
property not actually taken, but injuriously af-
fected, in all cases where such damages are 
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section. 
No improvements put upon the property subse-
quent to the date of service of summons shall be 
included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages. 
By its separate answer (K. 21-42) the Deere Estate 
raised as an issue the necessity for the condemnation, 
from an adverse determination of which no appeal is 
taken. Defendants also raised therein the dual issues of 
first, the extent of the property to be condemned in terms 
of "separate parcels" and parts thereof; and secondly, the 
time of and extent of the damage resulting from the 
taking, for which the State and Federal Constitutions 
guaranteed the condemnee "just compensation". 
Plaintiff's motion to strike the answer was granted 
as to all affirmative matters therein (E. 21, 43). 
(a) More specifically, the answer (E. 12) denied 
the State's allegation that the Deere Estate property 
consisted of but a single parcel, or "the whole of an 
entire parcel". (E. 19.) Defendants in their answer set 
forth in detail their contention as to each of the parcels 
4 
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involved and the fair market values thereof as of July 
12, 1951 (R. 21-39). The separate answer also set forth 
defendants' claims for severance damages (R. 39-40). 
In this connection the applicable portions of Section 
104-34-10 of the Judicial Code read as follows: 
104-34-10. Compensation and damages — How 
Assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon apper-
taining to the realty, and of each and every sepa-
rate estate or interest therein; and if it consists 
of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of 
each estate or interest therein shall be separately 
assessed. 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
# # # 
(5) As far as practicable compensation must 
be assessed for each source of damages separately. 
(Chapter 58, Laws of Utah 1951.) 
The essential physical facts as to the nature of the 
Deere Estate property—a total of approximately 215.73 
acres in the vicinity—are not in dispute. The property is 
5 
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described in detail in the separate answer (R. 21-42), the 
Bray ton affidavit (R. 41-47), the supplemental Brayton 
affidavit (R. 68-77); and its characteristics are shown in 
the maps attached to the separate answer, the court's 
order of March 5, 1952 (R. 81-88) and the large maps 
which are Exhibits 1 and B. For a ready reference de-
fendants suggest use of the map found at page 78 of the 
record reproduced herein, or that between pages 47 and 
48 of the record, which is a workable reduction of the 
larger maps. 
In barest outline the Deere Estate property north of 
Emigration Canyon Road included 21 of a total of 38 
platted lots in Oak Hills Plat "A," a recorded residential 
subdivision; 41 of a total of 46 lots in the immediately 
adjacent unrecorded Oak Hills subdivision; and a 3.96-
acre area known as I-C. All of these, together with 
Tract I-D a mile to the south and completely segregated, 
were lumped together as "Parcel 1" by the court's order 
of March 5,1952. (R. 81-88.) Also on the north side of the 
canyon were 51 of a total of 55 partially subdivided lots 
in an area still further to the north and east known as 
IV-A; and finally all of the remaining land, largely un-
improved or "raw," colored on the maps in brown and blue 
and known as areas I I and VI. Included on the extreme 
east end of Tract VI was the Deere Estate water source 
and collecting system, with transmission and distribution 
lines extending to the platted lots to the west. 
On the south side of Emigration Canyon Road, in 
addition to Tract I-D in the extreme southwest corner, 
was the remaining "bottom land" alongside Emigration 
6 
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Canyon stream, Area I I I ; a completely isolated area to 
the east, Area V; the acreage north of dedicated Ken-
nedy Drive extending to the brow of the plateau; and 
finally a part only of the area south of Kennedy Drive, 
severed from the balance of the Deere Estate's remaining 
property extending still further to the south by the 
straight line boundary of the legislative fiat. The court's 
order of March 5, 1952 lumped all of this into "Parcel 2", 
together with all of those portions on the north side of 
Emigration Canyon not included in "Parcel 1." (R. 81-
88 and map a part of this order, and Ex. B.) 
Included with the condemned land in addition to the 
water system were various interests in streets, water 
rights and other items the details of which are not 
involved in this appeal. Some of these interests plaintiff 
itself excluded from consideration in the condemnation 
proceeding for various reasons not here involved, and 
others were excluded by the court but are not involved 
in this appeal. 
Rejecting both plaintiff's contention that defendants' 
land consisted of but the single "Parcel 28," and defend-
ants' contention that many separate parcels were in-
volved, the court initially determined on the basis of the 
Brayton affidavit and defendants' answer to interroga-
tories (R. 44-47, 57-58) that defendants' property to be 
condemned consisted of these two, and only two "parcels," 
all of each of which was to be condemned with accordingly 
no severance damage. (R. 81-88 and map attached to this 
order, par. 4 thereof, R. 92.) 
7 
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An application for an interlocutory appeal from this 
crucial order was denied by this court. (Case No. 7839.) 
The District Court thereafter consistently adhered 
to this "two-parcel decision" and its resultant implica-
tions when from time to time issues pertaining thereto 
were raised during the further proceedings, such as by 
defendants' proposed Instructions 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18 
and 20. (R. 100-110.) All evidence as to severance damage 
was excluded and eliminated from consideration by the 
jury; e.g., the court refused to give defendants' requested 
Instructions Nos. 13, 14 and 16. (R. 105-108.) These de-
fendants duly excepted to the court's instructions, which 
were given consistently in accordance with its initial 
"two-parcel" order, e.g., Instructions 6, 8 and 9. (R. 112-
114). The court rejected all evidence as to lot values, 
etc. (R. 95-96.) The water system was lumped in as 
part of "Parcel 2." (R. 97-98.) 
(b) Also alleged in the answer and stricken was 
defendants' averment that under the circumstances of this 
case and the application of the special legislative man-
date to this particular property, the effective date of tak-
ing for all practical purposes, and thus the time of ac-
crual of defendants' constitutional right to damages, was 
July 12, 1951, the date summons was served; and the dam-
ages thus would include not only the fair market value 
of the property taken as of that date, but also interest 
thereon from that date until payment, (R. 40.) 
As to this issue, the court likewise continued to 
adhere to its early decision that the time of taking of 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
both title and possession would not be until entry of the 
condemnation judgment (May 27, 1952); therefore the 
award of just compensation should not include interest 
from July 12, 1952 until time of payment. For example, 
a requested instruction to allow interest was refused 
(R. I l l ) ; and defendants' motion to include such interest 
in the judgment on the verdict (R. 127-128) was denied. 
(R, 129.) 
Judgment on the jury's verdict was in due course 
made and entered May 10,1952. (R. 117-126.) Thereafter 
plaintiff deposited with the court its draft for the amount 
of the jury's verdict and costs. (R. 130.) On May 27,1952 
the court made and entered the usual condemnation judg-
ment whereby plaintiff took title and possession. (R, 131-
139.) 
From both the judgment on the verdict and the final 
judgment of condemnation, defendants on June 9, 1952 
appealed to this court. (R. 146.) 
II. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court improperly refused to award defend-
ants as a part of the just compensation to be paid pur-
suant to state and federal Constitutions not only the fair 
market value of defendants' property as of the date taken, 
but in addition interest upon that fair market value com-
puted at the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10, 
1952, when the fair market value was determined. 
2. The court improperly refused to allow these de-
9 
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fendants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witnesses on 
the subject of the actual market values of comparable 
property as of July 12, 1951, and likewise excluded evi-
dence as to the actual market values of such comparable 
properties. 
3. The court below improperly refused to allow ap-
pellants to introduce evidence relating to the fair market 
value of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part 
thereof. 
4. The court improperly, ruled that the property 
of appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole 
of but two separate parcels, each to be separately assess-
ed. 
5. The court improperly eliminated the issue of 
severance damages. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Point. 
1. The court improperly refused to award defendants 
as a part of the just compensation to be paid pursuant to 
state and federal Constitutions not only the fair market 
value of defendants' property as of the date taken, but in 
addition interest upon that fair market value computed at 
the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10, 1952, when 
that fair market value was determined. 
Utah took from the owners the Deere Estate prop-
erty when pursuant to specific legislative mandate, sum-
mons was served July 12, 1951. Possession as such be-
came worthless the moment the special legislation was 
10 
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enacted; certainly not later than the time summons was 
served. For practical and moral purposes this had actual-
ly occurred when Chapter 13 became effective June 18, 
1951, for the owners could hardly continue their develop-
ment operations in the light of an inevitable acquisition 
by the State. 
Not only was there no value to the temporarily ex-
tended bare right of possession of this property which 
could no longer be sold, improved, developed or used. 
Actually it was a burden, for defendants were required 
to continue operation of its pumps to keep the water sys-
tem from freezing. When defendants called up plaintiff's 
motion for occupancy, the plaintiff resisted its own mo-
tion. (R. 82.) Yet the court below refused to permit proof 
of the obvious facts showing the deprivation of defend-
ants' property, and struck defendants' averments in their 
answer with respect thereto. (R. 21, 42.) 
Article I of Utah's Constitution reads in part as fol-
lows: 
Sec. 7. (Due process of law.) 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Sec. 22. (Private property for public use.) 
Private property shall not be taken or dam-
ages for public use without just compensation. 
Likewise, payment of "just compensation" is required 
of the State of Utah by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, the test being the same as is re-
quired of the Federal Government itself under the Fifth 
11 
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Amendment. For example, see Orgel on Valuation under 
Eminent Domain, Section 5, page 17, wherein it is said: 
"Since the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution is binding on every state, 
this requirement (of just compensation) deter-
mines the minimum basis of compensation 
throughout the entire United States." 
The United States Supreme Court has phrased "just 
compensation" to be "the full and perfect equivalent of 
the property taken." Without elaborating principles now 
so fundamental a part of the law of eminent domain, we 
invite attention to the following key cases: 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. Co. v. 
Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; 
Ettor v. Tacoma, 
228 U.S. 148, 57 L. ed 733, 33 S. Ct. 428; 
McCov v. Union Elevated RR. Co., 
247 U.S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1158, 38 S. Ct. 504; 
Bragg v. Weaver, 
251 U.S. 57, 64 L. ed. 135, 40 S. Ct. 62; 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v. 
Morristown, 
276 U.S. 182, 72 L. ed. 523, 48 S. Ct. 276; 
Olson v. United States, 
292 U.S. 246, 78 L. ed. 1236, 54 S. Ct. 704; 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 299, 304, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354, 256, 
67 L. ed. 664. 
Allowance of interest pursuant to the overriding con-
stitutional provisions is implied in the absence of express 
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statutory authorization of such. Otherwise the condemna-
tion legislation would violate the federal and usually 
also the applicable state constitutional provisions. Sim-
mons v. Dillon, (W. Va.) 193 S.E. 331, 113 A.L.K. 787. 
Thus in the Seaboard Air Line case cited above, the 
court held: 
"The compensation to which the owner is en-
titled is the full and perfect equivalent of the prop-
erty taken. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United 
States, (supra) 148 U.S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622, 37 L. 
Ed. 463. It rests on equitable principles and it 
means substantially that the owner shall be put in 
as good position pecuniarily as he would have been 
if his property had not been taken. (Citing cases.) 
l ie is entitled to the damages inflicted by the tak-
ing . . . 
"Where the LTnited States condemns and takes 
possession of land before ascertaining or paying 
compensation, the owner is not limited to the value 
of the property at the time of the taking; he is en-
titled to such addition as will produce the full equi-
valent of that value paid contemporaneously with 
. the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good 
measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be 
added. The legal rate of interest, as established 
by the South Carolina statute was applied in this 
case. This was a 'palpably fair and reasonable 
method of performing the indispensable condition 
to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, 
namely, of making "just compensation" for the 
land as it stands, at the time of taking. ' . . . 
"The addition of interest allowed by the Dis-
trict Court is necessary in order that the owner 
shall not suffer loss and shall have 'just compensa-
13 
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tion' to which he is entitled." 
Again in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 
U.S. 106, 44 S, Ct, 471, 68 L. ed. 934, the court said: 
"And, if the taking precedes the payment of 
compensation, the owner is entitled to such addi-
tion to the value at the time of the taking as will 
produce the full equivalent of such value paid con-
temporaneously. Interest at a proper rate is a 
good measure of the amount to be added/' (Italics 
ours.) 
The same rule was applied in United States v. Rogers, 
255 U.S. 163, 41 S. Ct. 281, 65 L. ed. 566. 
The Utah statute is of course silent with respect to 
any allowance of interest, thus requiring application of 
the foregoing rule. 
Utah's condemnation statutes which implement these 
constitutional minimum requirements are neither unique 
nor unusual. Section 104-34-10 provides for the determin-
ation of the value of the property taken, and lays down 
rules for determination of that value. The section follow-
ing then provides that "the right thereto shall be deemed 
to have accrued" to that value and is to be measured as 
of the date of service of summons. Counterparts of these 
provisions are found in California, Deering's 1941 Civil 
Code, §§ 1249,1254; in the Idaho Code, §§ 7-712 and 7-717; 
and in Montana Revised Codes 1935, §§ 9945 and 9952. 
(a) On facts such as are here present, payment of 
interest is required. 
On facts similar to those pertaining to the Deere Es-
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tate property, and applying the identical Idaho statute 
to a case where a large tract of land was condemned for 
purposes connected with the American Falls Reservoir, 
the Federal District Court squarely held that to the 
award of the fair market value as of the date summons 
was served should be added interest. United States v. 
Brown, 279 F. 168. On cross writ of error from the award 
of interest, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 68 L. ed. 171. The 
court in part said; 
"The district court, in directing the jury, fol-
lowed the law of the state (Idaho Comp. Laws 
1919, § 7415; Idaho Rev. Codes 1908, § 5221) in 
which the land lay and the court was sitting, as fol-
lows : 
"For the purpose of assessing compensation 
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the summons, and its 
actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of 
compensation for all property to be actually taken. 
. . . No improvements put upon the property sub-
sequent to the date of the service of summons shall 
be included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages." 
"The Idaho statute has been construed by the 
circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit to 
justify the court in adding interest upon the value 
fixed by the jury from the date of the summons 
until the judgment. Weiser Valley Land & Water 
Co. v. Ryan, 111 C C A . 221,190 Fed. 417, 424. The 
court said: 
"Having such right to compensation at a 
given time, it would seem that the owner ought to 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have interest on the amount ascertained until paid. 
In the meanwhile lie can claim nothing for added 
improvements, nor is he entitled to any advance 
that might affect the value of the property." 
«* * # ^
 0 f { e n happens that in the delays in-
cident to condemnation suits the loss to the owner 
arising from the delay between the summons and 
the vesting of title by judgment is a serious one. 
The interest charge under the Idaho statute has 
the wholesome effect of stimulating the plaintiff in 
condemnation to prompt action. Moreover, the 
plaintiff may reduce to a minimum the rents and 
profits enjoyed by the defendant,, because, under 
the Idaho statute, the plaintiff may have a sum-
mary preliminary hearing before commissioners to 
fix probable damages, and by depositing the 
amount so fixed with the clerk of the court, if the 
defendant will not accept it, the plaintiff may ob-
tain immediate possession. Within less than a 
month after bringing suit, he can thus appropriate 
to himself the rents and profits of the land, and 
in enjoyment of them can await the final judgment. 
2 Idaho Comp. Stat. 1919, § 7420; 2 Idaho Rev. 
Codes 1908, § 5226." 
A concise statement of the rule in such cases is found 
in Duncan-Hood Corporation v. City of Summit, (N.J.), 
146 Atl. 182, wherein the court states: 
"The final ground for reversal urged is that 
the trial court added to the verdicts, as returned 
by the jury, interest from the date of the adoption 
of the ordinance to the date of rendering the ver-
dicts. 
"This was not error. As before indicated, the 
taking of the lands of respondents was as of and 
from the date the ordinance in question became 
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effective. At that date the damage, if any, to re-
spondents arose and accrued, and they were en-
titled to be compensated as of that date. Such 
compensation having been withheld, they were en-
titled to the amount thereof, together with interest 
for the forbearance. 
"For the reasons herein set forth, the judg-
ments under review are reversed, and a venire de 
novo awarded. 
"For affirmance: None. 
"For reversal: The CHANCELLOR, the 
CHIEF JUSTICE, Justices TRENCHARD, 
PARKER, CAMPBELL, LLOYD, and CASE, 
and Judges VAN BUSKIRK, McGLENNON, 
KAYS, HETFIELD, and DEAR." 
To these unanimous decisions of the federal district, 
circuit and supreme courts involving the identical statu-
tory provisions applied to facts similar to those in this 
case, and to the opinion of the highest of the New Jersey 
courts, we add the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court 
in an analogous situation. Campau v. City of Detroit, 196 
N.W. 527, 32 A.L.R. 91. Here also land for a proposed 
public park was involved, to be condemned under a pro-
cedure wherein the City had one years' time within which 
to pay the award after it should be confirmed and thus 
become final. Confirmation corresponded in the present 
case to the date of the passage of Chapter 13, or at most 
the date of service of summons, at which time the injury 
and damages to the Deere Estate became fixed by virtue 
of the legislative mandate. 
In the Michigan case the owner claimed interest be-
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tween the date of "taking," and the date of actual pay-
ment of the award. As here, the condemnor tendered 
the award without such interest, which the owner refused 
to accept in full settlement. During the interim, as here, 
the owner continued in possession, and the ordinance was 
silent as to interest. 
Interest was allowed, in view of the Federal Consti-
tution and the similar provisions of the Michigan Consti-
tution. 
With the exception of the foregoing decisions directly 
or by analogy in point, we have found no other applicable 
determinations by courts of other jurisdictions. The rea-
son is obvious, for almost invariably the taking in condem-
nation proceedings coincides with payment, or at a least 
payment occurs within a reasonable time of the determin-
ation of the amount of compensation due. However, gene-
ral discussions and annotations on the allowability of in-
terest, even though the owner remains in possession, may 
be found in connection with the Brown case at 68 L. ed. 
171; in 96 A.L.E, 196, supplemented at 111 A.L.E. 1306, 
paragraphs V I I I ( b ) ; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., 
§ 742, p. 1319; OrgePs Valuation under Eminent Domain, 
§ 5, p. 17; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 275; and 29 
C. J.S., Eminent Domain, § 176, where it is noted on page 
1054 that "the mere fact of delay in bringing to a hearing 
the determination of damage does not defeat the owner's 
right to interest.' ' 
It is respectfully submitted that justice, logic and 
reason support the authorities above which under the 
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facts of this particular case hold that the taking of the 
owner's property and the injury and damage to the Deere 
Estate here occurred June 18, 1951, or at least by July 
12, 1951; and that accordingly interest subsequent to that 
date should be allowed as a part of the just compensation 
to make the owner whole. With respect to the wisdom of 
the action taken by unequivocal mandate of Utah's legis-
lature, we are not here concerned. 
(b) Utah is in accord. 
This Court in the case of Fell v. Union Pacific ER. 
Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 28 L.R.A. 1, reviewed ex-
tensively the reason for the allowance of interest, sum-
marizing as follows: 
"The true test to be applied as to whether in-
terest should be allowed before judgment in a 
given case or not is, therefore, not whether the 
damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but 
whether the injury and consequent damages are 
complete and must be ascertained as of a particu-
lar time and in accordance with fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value, which the 
court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, 
rather than be guided by their best judgment in as-
sessing the amount to be allowed for past as well 
as for future injury, or for elements that cannot 
be measured by any fixed standards of value. 
Here it will be noted that the three factors of the 
"true test" were each present: 
a. The injury and consequent damage to the Deere 
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Estate were complete June 18, 1951, or certainly when 
summons was served July 12,1951; 
b. Damages were to be determined as of that par-
ticular time; and 
c. Damages were to be determined in accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence. 
Of course where there has been no damage and hence 
the taking does not occur until the final condemnation 
judgment, the tests outlined above are not met. Thus this 
court has held that where the owners remain in continued 
enjoyment of the property with no impairment as to its 
use, there is no right to interest because there has been no 
loss to be compensated. Such cases stand on their own 
facts, e.g., Oregon Short Line BR. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 
147, 80 P. 732, and Salt Lake & Utah RR. Co. v. Schramm, 
56 Utah 53,189 P. 90. Here, we again reiterate, under the 
facts of the peculiar legislative mandate and the applic-
able general statutes the Deere Estate was just as effec-
tively deprived of its property June 18, 1951 or at least 
by July 12, 1951 as if the State of Utah had then physi-
cally obtained possession. The injury and the damage 
were then complete and the only thing remaining was to 
determine the extent of that damage in accordance with 
the fixed rules of evidence and the proceedings applic-
able to condemnation cases. 
That no actual physical taking at all is necessary 
wras the holding in the case of State v. Fourth Judicial 
District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502, the court dividing, 
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however, as to whether the facts in the particular case 
constituted a taking. 
How different the facts here, where to quote from 
the supreme courts of Connecticut and Minnesota, the 
owner, effective at least by July 12,1951, was "practically 
deprived of his right to dispose of the land. His posses-
sion is precarious, liable to be terminated at any time; he 
cannot safely rent; he cannot safely improve; if he sows, 
he cannot be sure that he will reap." Clark v. Cox, 
(Conn.) 56 Atl. 2d 512; Warren v. Railroad, 21 Minn. 424, 
427. 
From the facts in this case it is obvious that posses-
sion by the Deere Estate became worse than valueless 
June 18, 1951 or certainly when summons was served. 
Not only could the estate for practical purposes neither 
dispose of, rent, improve, or farm the land; the owner 
had to terminate the various improvement contracts and 
then continue to maintain the utility pumps to avoid ex-
tensive damage to the water system without compensation 
until the State eventually should conclude the act di-
rected "forthwith" by the legislature, by inevitably tak-
ing legal title and possession. 
(c) A new trial is not required. 
Mathematically, the interest on the fair market value 
of the defendants' property between the date of the in-
jury and the time when the amount of the award was de-
termined can readily be computed. At six per cent it 
amounts to $24,799.32 for the period July 12, 1951 until 
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May 10, 1952. 
This amount the court below could and should have 
included in the judgment on the verdict, no jury question 
being involved. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Oliver (Okla.), 
87 P. 423, 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 742 at page 1324. 
This error can be corrected by simple direction of 
this court, no new trial or resubmission to the jury being 
required. 
Thus in Reed v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul RR. 
Co. (C.C.), 25 F . 886, Mr. Justice Shiras said: 
"Until the verdict is rendered it cannot be 
known whether plaintiff may be entitled to inter-
est. When this is determined by the amount of 
the verdict, the court can then make the proper 
order, and the same will form part of the adjudica-
tion, settling damages." 
Accordingly on appeal the Circuit Court determined the 
amount of interest to which plaintiff was entitled, added 
this to the amount of the verdict as returned by the jury, 
and rendered judgment for the aggregate amount. 
Again, the case of Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 
13 S.W. 123, 8 L.R.A. 123, was a condemnation proceed-
ing. No instruction as to interest was given or requested 
and none was allowed by the jury. Before judgment was 
rendered Alloway moved the court to add interest, as 
the defendants did here for the Deere Esta te ; and there 
also the motion was rejected and on appeal such refusal 
was assigned as error. The Supreme Court said: 
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"Refusal to add interest was error. * * * 
Inasmuch as the error can be readily corrected 
here, that will be done, instead of reversing and 
remanding. This court will render the judgment 
that should have been rendered below." 
See also Warren v. St. Paul & Pacific RE. Co., 21 
Minn. 424, and Whiteacre v. St. Paul & Sioux RR, Co., 
24 Minn. 311, where the same practice is approved by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court; and also 3 Elliott on Rail-
roads, p. 1457, and 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 277. 
Finally, although the cases and authorities are num-
erous enunciating the principle, we refer to the recent 
opinion of this court in Morris v. Russell, 236 P. 2d 451, 
w^here the same rule was invoked. References therein 
were made to decisions in Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky
 > 
Illinois, and to another recent decision of this court in 
Simmons v. Wilkin, 80 Utah 362,15 P. 2d 321. 
Point. 
2. The court improperly refused to allow these de-
fendants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witnesses on the 
subject of the actual market values of comparable property 
as of July 12, 1951, and likewise excluded direct evidence as 
to the actual market values of such comparable properties. 
Plaintiff's witnesses all had had extensive exper-
ience and were familiar with the property under con-
demnation, as well as comparable properties and their 
market values. They were each permitted accordingly to 
express their opinion as to the fair market value of the 
two parcels. For example, reference is made to the testi-
mony of Witness Edward M. Ashton in this respect. 
(S.R. 29-37.) 
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On cross examination the court below absolutely 
excluded defendant from testing the experts' opinions 
on the basis of the market values of such comparable 
lands. For example, Witness Ashton was asked with 
respect to the adjacent Indian Hills Subdivision, and 
objections to such line of questioning were sustained. 
MR. B E H L E : I assume, for the record, I am 
foreclosed in testing this witness in respect to 
comparative values on any basis; front foot, acre-
age, per lot, as well as asking him in regard to his 
subdivision ? 
T H E COURT: Well, you may, unless there 
is objection, proceed the same with him as you 
did with Mr. Kiepe. Is that what you mean? 
MR. B E H L E : Well, I thought the rulings 
cut me off from any of that so I wanted to be sure. 
In other words, I understand I can't ask the wit-
ness what land in the vicinity comparable to this 
land sells for, either by an acre basis or a front 
foot basis, or a lot basis, is that correct? 
THE COURT: Well, yes. I ruled against 
you on that with Mr. Kiepe and I would do the 
same with Mr. Ashton. 
MR. B E H L E : Yes, sure. In other words, I 
can't test on comparative sales, on comparative 
sales prices? 
THE COURT: That is correct. You cannot. 
(S.R. 40-41.) 
I t will also be readily remembered that a large por-
tion of the Deere Estate lands consisted of subdivided 
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residential lots, more than twenty of which had been 
sold to individual purchasers on the open market to 
other defendants in the condemnation proceeding. Yet 
the court below absolutely excluded direct evidence or 
cross examination as to lot or acreage values of property 
comparable to either the lots or acreage of the Deere 
Estate. 
MR. B E H L E : If the Court please, I think 
the record is clear on our proffer of proof of 
comparable values. I think the door has been 
closed on us every time we have tried to prove 
and test values, and here is a specific instance. 
T H E COURT: Well, the only reason that the 
door is closed to you is that the law provides 
that you shall not do that and I try to follow 
what the law is. I am not trying to close any 
door on you and if you have any doubt about it 
I can show you the authorities on the value of a 
place. Well, that case Mr. Budge had the other 
day covers that subject. It has not been permitted 
and you persist in it and it is against the law. 
MR. B E H L E : Well, of course, that is one 
of the arguments we have been having right 
along. 
THE COURT: Well, that is right. Of course 
I have been ruling against you because I have 
been ruling it is not lawful for you to divide this 
property into lots, nor the price per lot, or any 
other property into lots or the values of them. 
(S.R. 42-43.) 
MR. B E H L E : We also specifically tender 
proof with respect to Indian Village as a com-
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parable subdivision purchased on an acreage basis 
as raw acreage and the value per acre of $7,500.06 
shortly before the date of condemnation and the 
characteristics of that area as being comparable-. 
MR. BUDGE: Same objection. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. B E H L E : For the record only we again 
make a tender in connection with lot sales and 
prices. 
MR. BUDGE: Same objection. 
T H E COURT: Within the area being con-
demned! 
MR. B E H L E : Within the area and compar-
able to the area. 
MR. BUDGE: Same objection. 
T H E COURT: The objection is sustained. 
(S.R. 52.) 
We would have thought it clear that the best evi-
dence of the market value of land, or for that matter 
almost any tangible property with a market value, would 
be the actual figures as to which that or comparable 
property was selling for on the open market at about 
the time of the valuation. 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 
Ch. XXI. Certainly that is how one proves the value of 
stocks active on the market, or one's automobile, or 
home. 
But here all such evidence was completely excluded 
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—whether on a front-foot, lot, or acreage basis—under 
a sweeping ruling by the court that all such evidence 
was improper. 
This court, in keeping with the Massachusetts doc-
trine or weight of opinion, is cited by Nichols (§21.3) 
as in accord with the weight of opinion that such evidence 
is admissible. Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 
4,125 P. 399. 
The result of Judge Van Cott's ruling, which ex-
tended also to cross examination, was to leave before 
the jury a naked opinion as to the value of two parcels 
only, and for practical purposes to cut off and restrict 
inquiry into just how such dollar figures were reached 
by the testifying experts. 
Defendants respectfully submit such errors require 
reversal for the reasons so well expressed in St. Louis, 
etc. BE. Co. v. Clark (Mo.), 25 S.W. 192, 26 L.R.A. 751, 
as follows: 
We think the evidence of sales of similar 
property to that in question, made in the neighbor-
hood, about the same time, was admissible to aid 
the jury in determining the damage to which the 
owner was entitled. The value of property is 
ascertained largely from such sales, and the 
opinions of witnesses as to values are largely 
predicated upon them. It is best, when it can be 
done, to put the jurors in possession of all the 
facts from which values are ascertained, and allow 
them to draw the conclusion therefrom. Witnesses 
basing their opinion upon recent sales of like 
property are liable to exaggerate or underesti-
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mate values; in any consideration they are no 
more capable of deducing fair conclusions from 
the known facts than the jury. The object is to 
ascertain the general market value, and if par-
ticular sales are made under exceptional circum-
stances the fact can be shown, and the jury can 
determine its probative force. Certainly no more 
reliable method of determining the fair market 
values of lands can be reached than that derived 
from bona fide sales of similar lands in the 
vicinity. The objection that such evidence raises 
collateral issues as to the character of the land 
sold, and the circumstances of such sales, is more 
than compensated for by its value in aiding the 
jury to a correct conclusion. (Italics ours.) 
Point. 
3. The court below improperly refused to allow appel-
lants to introduce evidence relating to the fair market value 
of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part thereof. 
To prove the value of the Deere Estate water utility 
system, defendants called as an expert witness Engi-
neer C. J . Ullrich, who was intimately familiar with 
and exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion 
as to the value of that water system. This system con-
sisted of a series of springs, an extensive collection and 
storage system including dual electric pumps and two 
large storage tanks, transmission lines to the various 
points of use throughout the area under condemnation, 
and then finally distribution lines into the residential 
areas and other points of use. The witness described 
the system in detail and testified that as an integrated 
water utility it had been planned for immediate use in 
the general Oak Hills area and for ultimate use else-
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where after 1952, when Oak Hills was to be connected 
with the Salt Lake City municipal water system. Objec-
tions were sustained to all questions with respect to the 
value of that water system or of any part thereof. 
(S.R. 9-14.) A tender of proof was rejected as to the 
fair market value of that water system (exclusive of 
land rights) being $74,200.00, assignable $10,500.00 to 
the water rights and $63,700.00 to the balance of the 
system, of which $25,700.00 was allocated to that part 
of the distribution system within the streets of Parcel 
I, these being the fair market values as of July 15, 1951. 
(S.R. 16.) 
No reason was .assigned for this exclusion, which 
seems beyond comprehension when the general rule is 
that such a utility not only may but must be valued by 
witnesses who have "some peculiar means of forming 
an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of 
the property in question." Thus it is said that the valua-
tion by utility experts is "almost mandatory in all cases 
since it is obvious that values cannot be based in such. 
cases on sales or on values at which such property is 
held in the vicinity." 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
§ 18.47. 
Yet not only did the court exclude the opinion of 
the only expert on water utility values; it permitted 
lay real estate men to lump the utility's value in with 
the land on the basis of indefinite hearsay discussions 
"with the engineers in the City Water Department, the 
most logical buyers." (S.R. 45.) It violated Sec. 104-34-10. 
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Point. 
4. The court improperly ruled that the property of 
appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole of but 
two separate parcels, each to be separately assessed. 
a. The Statutory Mandate: 
As a matter of right, an owner whose property is 
condemned is entitled under Utah law to a separate 
assessment for each different parcel of his land that is 
taken. He is also entitled as a matter of right to an 
award for any net severance damages where there is 
only a partial taking, in addition to the value of the 
part taken. The policy laid down by Utah's legislature 
is to assess separately for each source of damages as 
far as practical. 
104-34-10. Compensation and damages—How 
Assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon apper-
taining to the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein; and if it cow,-
sists of different parcels, the value of each parcel 
and of each estate or interest therein shall be 
separately assessed. 
(2) / / the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sought to be condemned by reason of its sever-
ance from the portion sought to be condemned 
and the construction of the improvement in the 
maimer proposed by the plaintiff. 
(5) As far as practicable compensation must 
be assessed for each source of damages separately. 
(Ch. 8, Laws of Utah 1951). (Italics ours.) 
As pointed out in the opinions in the case of State 
v. Fourth District Court, 78 P. 2d 502, 94 Utah 384, the 
extent and measure of damages under Utah law goes 
beyond strict constitutional guaranties; and although 
these provisions have been on the statute books of Utah, 
California, Montana and Idaho, among other states, for 
many decades, their mandate is so clear and unequivocal 
that there have been few cases with respect thereto, espe-
cially in recent times. 
b. What Constitutes a "Separate Parcel": 
Decision as to what constitutes a separate parcel to 
be separately assessed is ordinarily a question of law 
for the court to determine, since the determinative phy-
sical facts are generally not in dispute. But if there is 
a conflict as to these facts, a question of fact is presented 
for determination by the jury or court, as the case may 
be. 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 701; St. Paul 
& Sioux City EE. Co. v. Murphy, 19 Minn. 500. 
The three criteria in determining what constitutes 
a separate parcel within the meaning of the Utah Statute 
seem to be (1) common ownership, (2) physical contig-
uity, and (3) common use. All three factors usually must 
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be present, and as stated in Lewis, § 698: 
"In general it is so much as belongs to the 
same proprietor as that taken, and is continuous 
with it and used together for a common purpose." 
In the case of the Deere Estate, on the basis of the 
issues drawn and the record before the court there was 
no question as to ownership; the factors in question 
were those as to contiguity and common use. The evi-
dence was not in conflict, as we see it, and thus the matter 
became a question of law. But before looking to the 
various parts of the entire tract taken of more than 
thirteen city blocks—roughly, an area equivalent to that 
between North Temple and 8th South, and from State 
Street to West Temple Street, let us review further 
the authorities. 
Lewis at Section 699, discussing residential areas, 
states (italics ours) : 
If two or more contiguous city or village 
lots are improved and used as one tract, and 
any part of any one is taken, the owner may 
recover the damage to all; so, where a tract is 
subdivided into lots and blocks, but continues to 
be used as before for agricultural purposes, the 
subdivision being a mere paper one. In the last 
case it is intimated that a different rule might 
prevail if the lots were merely held for sale. 
Contiguous lots improved for separate use are 
not one tract. * * * Where a block is divided by a 
street, the parts become distinct tracts as to each 
other where they are merely held for sale or use 
as building lots. It is held that the subdivision 
of land into lots, makes each lot, prima facie, a 
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separate and distinct tract, and if the owner 
claims damages to all or more than the lot taken, 
he must produce evidence to overcome this pre-
sumption. The true rule would seem to be that 
lots and blocks improved or used for a common 
purpose should be regarded as one tract, though 
divided by a street or alley; that contiguous lots 
in the same block or square should be regarded 
as one tract, though vacant and held for sale or 
speculation; that lots improved for separate use 
should in general be regarded as separate tracts; 
but that if contiguous lots devoted to a separate 
use are more valuable for a common use they 
might properly be regarded as one tract: and that 
vacant lots and blocks, held for sale or speculation 
and separated by streets or alleys should be re-
garded as distinct tracts. 
The foregoing text is amply annotated by cases from 
various jurisdictions. The statements are substantially 
the same as those found in other standard works. For 
example, it is said in 18 Am. Jur . "Eminent Domain", 
Sec. 270: 
* * *In determining what constitutes a sep-
arate and independent parcel of land, when the 
property is actually used and occupied, unity of 
use is the principal test, and if a tract of land, 
no part of which is taken, is used in connection 
with the same farm, or the same manufacturing 
establishment, or the same enterprise of any other 
character as the tract, part of which was taken, it 
is not considered a separate and independent par-
cel merely because it was bought at a different 
time, and separated by an imaginary line, or even 
if the two tracts are separated by a highway, 
railroad or canal. * # * 
When parts of the same establishment are 
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separated by intervening private land, they are 
considered as independent parcels, unless they 
are so inseparably connected in the use to which 
they are applied that the injury or destruction 
of one must necessarily and permanently injure 
the other. So also, contiguous tracts owned by 
the same person, but used for different purposes 
and rented to different tenants, should be con-
sidered as separate tracts. If both are injured 
by the taking, it is proper to permit the jury to 
consider the reasonable market value of each 
tract. Even if two tracts are contiguous and 
owned by the same owner and used for the same 
purpose, if they are not used in connection with 
each other, they must be considered as separate 
tracts, as, for example, a block of city houses 
rented to different tenants for residential pur-
poses. Vacant and unoccupied land is considered 
to be separated into independent parcels by a 
public street, whatever the intention of the owner 
in regard to future use. A mere platting into 
blocks and lots has been held sufficient in the case 
of vacant land to show, prima facie, at least, a 
division into separate and independent parcels; 
although as to this there is authority to the con-
trary. 
See also Corpus Juris , Eminent Domain, Section 395; 
the annotation in 57 L.R.A. 937, at page 940; and the 
cases and comment in 2 American Railroad & Corporation 
Reports 184. 
Somewhat the same problem is presented in con-
nection with the requirements that real property be 
assessed for ad valorem tax purposes by "parcels or 
subdivisions not exceeding six hundred forty acres each 
* * V Utah Code, §80-5-8. The following case applies 
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the rule quoted above in connection with such tax stat-
utes : 
Generally, several lots in the same block, 
contiguous to each other and owned by the same 
person, are deemed one "parcel" of land within 
contemplation of statute requiring full cash value 
of each "parcel" of land attached to be set down 
in assessment roll. Code 1930, § 69-242, subd. 4. 
Guthrie v. Harm, Or., 76 P. 2d 292, 294. 
The same problem also is presented where in mort-
gage or execution sales, and in order to realize a higher 
amount for the debtor, real property consisting of several 
known lots or "parcels" is to be sold "separately and not 
as a unit." 
The recent Utah case of Commercial Bank v. Madsen, 
236 P. 2d 343, again applies the same rule set forth above 
as to condemnation and tax assessment. In that case two 
contiguous lots owned by the same debtor and in use as a 
"unified parcel" were held to be the proper subject of a 
single sale. In that case, as the court pointed out,— 
The bank prepared and accepted a mortgage 
of this property as one parcel; in its pleadings, 
judgment, notice of sale and throughout the entire 
proceeding it was treated by the bank as one 
parcel of property. The sheriff and two other wit-
nesses all testified that they considered the land 
as a. single parcel of property. The judgment 
debtor testified to the effect that he did not object 
to the sale as a unit and that he had no reason to 
think more money could be raised if the lots were 
sold separately. The fact that the land is described 
as "Lots 1 and 2 of block 28, Plat A Manti City 
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Survey" does not serve to make separate tracts 
of an otherwise unified parcel. For a discussion 
to the effect that description of property by lots 
does not serve to make it separate parcels, see: 
33 C. J.S., Executions, § 210, p. 449. 
Finally, we quote from Volume 4 of Nichols' work 
on Eminent Domain, the third edition of which has just 
been published: 
§14.31. What constitutes a separate parcel. 
Difficult questions sometimes arise in deter-
mining what constitutes a separate or independent 
parcel or tract of land. There are a few definite 
rides of law that can be laid down. In many cases 
the court can, as a matter of law, determine that 
lots are distinct or otherwise, but ordinarily it is 
a practical question to be decided by the jury or 
other similar tribunal which passes upon matters 
of fact, which should consider evidence on the use 
and appearance of the land, its legal divisions 
and the intent of its owner and conclude whether 
on the whole the lots are separate or not. In such 
cases the land itself rather than the map should 
be looked at, and one part of a parcel is not to be 
considered separate and independent merely be-
cause it was bought at a different time from the 
rest and is separated from it by an imaginary line. 
(1) Physical contiguity. 
Actual contiguity between two separate par-
cels is ordinarily essential to merit consideration 
as a unified tract. Actual physical separation by 
an intervening space between two parcels belong-
ing to the same owner is ordinarily ground for 
holding that the parcels are to be treated as inde-
pendent of each other, but it is not necessarily a 
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conclusive test. If the land is actually occupied 
or in use the unity of the use is the chief criterion. 
When two parcels are physically distinct there 
must be such a connection or relation of adapta-
tion, convenience and actual and permanent use 
as to make the enjoyment of one reasonably nec-
essary to the enjoyment of the other in the most 
advantageous manner in the business for which 
it is used, to constitute a single parcel within 
the meaning of the rule. Accordingly, a public 
highway actually wrought and travelled, a rail-
road, a canal, or a creek running through a large 
tract devoted to one purpose does not necessarily 
divide it into independent parcels, provided the 
owner has the legal right to cross the intervening 
strip of land or water. But a public highway will 
ordinarily divide the land of a single owner into 
separate parcels, even if both parcels are used for 
the same purpose, if the use upon each parcel 
is separate and independent of that upon the other. 
When land is unoccupied and so not devoted 
to use of any character, and especially when it 
is held for purposes of sale in building lots, a 
physical division by wrought roads and streets 
creates independent parcels as a matter of law. 
* * * (Italics ours.) 
c. Appellants have not Waived their Right for Sepa-
rate Assessments. 
Throughout the trial and also by its application to 
this court for an interlocutory appeal, appellants assert-
ed their right to separate assessments for each parcel. 
Thus the right has not been waived, as did occur in Idaho 
under an identical statute where likewise a large area 
of land was condemned for reservoir purposes. In the 
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case of Big Lost River Irr . Co. v. Davidson (Ida.), 121 
P . 88, 92, it was said: 
Under the provisions of the statute it was 
not necessary that the jury should find the value 
of each legal subdivision of the tract sought to 
be condemned. If, however, there is more than 
one parcel of land, or several separate parcels 
or tracts, each separated from the other, then 
it is necessary for the jury to determine the value 
of each separate tract or parcel. But where the 
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value 
then may be fixed as a single parcel or tract. 
"Parcel" or "tract" of land, as used in this sec-
tion, does not mean legal subdivision, but a con-
solidated body of land, and the finding of the 
jury may be upon each single parcel or tract of 
land. 
d. The Physical Facts in this Case: 
Applying the foregoing law to the physical facts of 
the Deere Estate, we find that in the tract—more than 
thirteen large city blocks in area—there are not only 
recorded plats of lots and blocks, and the actual physical 
improvements constituting a subdivision, namely, streets, 
curb and gutter, drainage, fire hydrants, utilities, etc. 
Here we have further physical barriers such as mountain 
streams and the steep slopes and cliffs of Emigration 
Canyon. Sections of the Deere Estate property are more 
than a mile apart. Specifically: 
(1) There is an area of 50.60 acres described on 
the map as Tracts II , IV-C and VI, which is essentially 
hillside land. As to this area there are the required 
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requisites of common ownership, use and contiguity. 
In connection with this area will be involved the value 
Together this would constitute one "parcel", the land and 
the water utility system to be each separately assessed. 
(2) There is an area of 5.81 acres known as Tract 
V which is completely segregated from the other property 
owned by these defendants and wherein there is both 
common ownership and use. This area is more than half 
the size of Temple Square, and is a separate "parcel." 
(3) There is a third separate parcel of 7.35 acres 
known as Tract I I I which has been developed and is zoned 
for commercial purposes. I t is segregated from other 
areas by other ownerships on the east, by the state and 
county roads on the north and west, and by Emigration 
Canyon and Creek on the south. 
(4) South of Emigration Creek Canyon are Tracts 
I-D and IV-B, each of which is divided roughly east and 
west by a dedicated street—Kennedy Drive. 
(a) Tract I-D consists of a total of 6.65 acres. 
Of this, 1.5 acres is in the extreme southwest corner of the 
entire tract to be condemned. Obviously severance dam-
ages are involved. The same situation pertains to the 
south part of Tract IV-B. This consists of 5.43 acres arbi-
trarily cut out by a straight line division from the heart of 
a tier of proposed residential lots. I t is suggested that 
each of these two is par t of a larger parcel extending 
to the south wherein severance damages would be in-
volved, and that each should be segregated from the 
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balance of the other land of these defendants which has 
been taken. 
(b) The remaining area of Tract I-D north of Ken-
nedy Drive consists of 5.51 acres. The remaining area 
of Tract IV-B north of Kennedy Drive consists of 10.33 
acres—slightly in excess of the area of a large city block. 
If treated as separate parcels, no severance damages 
would be involved. It will be recalled that this par t of 
I-D comprises ten potential residential lots for which 
all utilities have been installed to the extent planned by 
the subdividers; while this part of area IV-B consists 
of 10.33 acres suitable and planned for residential de-
velopment, but wherein no utilities or other improve-
ments have been constructed except for Kennedy Drive. 
Under the authorities, together this entire contiguous 
area constituted another "parcel." 
(5) Tract IV-A is an area equal to nearly two city 
blocks—19.62 acres—on the extreme north of the entire 
tract herein condemned. As in the case of IV-B, it is 
suitable for and had been planned for residential de-
velopment. However no utilities had yet been installed 
and the only actual development on the ground had been 
construction of a dividing access road in place—Oakhills 
Eoad, and an access road to the Je r ry Jones property 
extending north from Oakhills Eoad opposite Lot 62 
owned by W. E. Graham. 
(a) The property to the east of the Je r ry Jones 
road consists of a total of 7.77 acres divided into twenty-
one lots and streets actually constructed and existing 
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but not yet dedicated. Of this area Lots 62, 63, 64 and 
65 had been sold to other defendants prior July 12, 
1951, the area so sold involving 1.13 acres and road 
access rights. These defendants owned the remaining 
lots and the roads comprising a total of 6.64 acres, con-
stituting another "separate parcel." 
(b) The tract west of the Jer ry Jones road consists 
of 34 lots and streets actually in place although not 
dedicated. This area which we submit constitutes a sep-
arate and different parcel comprises a total of 11.85 
acres—more than a large city block in extent, all of which 
is owned by these defendants. 
6. Finally, there is the balance of the areas denom-
inated in the Bray ton affidavits, the answer and by the 
various maps as Tracts I-A, I-B and I-C. Here all utili-
ties are in, and the property actually existed as a number 
of separate residential lots. The law seems clear that a 
separate parcel is involved prima facie for each lot, and 
at least for each group of contiguous lots. 
The total acreage owned by these defendants in Tract 
I-A is 7.51; in Tract I-B, 14.1; and in Tract I-C, 3.96. 
Tract I-C is a separate parcel because there the sub-
division was not physically complete; but in I-A were 
19 separate lots, and 41 separate lots in I-B. Grouping 
the contiguous lots as was done in requested Instruction 
No. 12 (R. 103), there would be 12 "separate parcels" 
in I-A and I-B as follows: 
a. Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Oak Hills Plat A. 
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b. Lot 1, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A. 
c. Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A. 
d. Lots 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, Block 3, Oak Hills Plat A. 
e. Lots 1, 2 and 3, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
f. Lot 6, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
g. Lots 8 and 9, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
h. Lot 11, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
i. Lots 5 and 6, Oak Hills Plat B. 
j . Lots 10,11 and 12, Oak Hills Plat B. 
k. Lots 69 to 82, Oak Hills Plat B. 
1. Lots 85 to 106, inclusive, Oak Hills Plat B. 
In summary then, as a matter of law under Section 
104-34-10, the property of these defendants under con-
demnation consisted of nineteen separate parcels, each to 
be separately assessed under mandate of Utah's legisla-
ture; and in addition the north parts of two additional 
separate parcels. In these last two cases the statutory 
mandate was that each of the parts taken was to be 
separately assessed; and then there was also to be deter-
mined the extent of any severance damages to the re-
maining parts of the two parcels involved. 
e. The effect of the two-parcel decision. 
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At the oral hearing on the application for an inter-
locutory appeal from the two-parcel order, Mr. Justice 
Crockett inquired as to just how condenmees were being 
prejudiced by the claimed violation of the statutory 
requirements, and why we should assume that Judge Van 
Cott would commit prejudicial error in the course of the 
trial. These questions were difficult if not impossible 
then to answer, but appellants' fears were fully justified 
by subsequent rulings of the court below as a consequence 
of the early decision. 
For example, plaintiff's witnesses were permitted 
to assume that since only two sales were to be made 
of the two parcels each as a whole, necessarily from the 
nature of the parcels the purchasers would be buying 
wholesale at a discount in order to obtain profits by 
resale of the individual lots and tracts. Thus, for exam-
ple, Witness Ashton's opinion started with an assumption 
that normal fair market values of the various components 
of the entire property totaled some $667,000.00. (Supp. 
K. 39.) Then by applying these assumptions he reduced 
this total for the two parcels to $491,250.00. (S.E. 33.) 
This was substantially the figure adopted by the jury. 
(R. 118.) 
Also as a consequence of the two-parcel decision, 
the court excluded either on direct or cross examination 
all evidence as to lot values or evidence of any compar-
able values at all. (S.E. 17, and Point 2 above.) The 
defendants were simply unable to support the figures 
claimed in their stricken separate answer as to the fair 
market values of the individual tracts or parcels con-
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stituting their land which was being condemned. The 
effect was to condemn not the property taken, but the 
owners because of the large extent of their holdings. 
To illustrate, a defendant owning a single lot in Oak 
Hills is afforded compensation to the extent of its full 
market value. The Deere Estate, owning the identical 
adjacent lot, is cut in two by reason of the application 
of the wholesale discounts, etc. If the ownership of the 
two lots were to be reversed, by reason of this change 
alone the values would reverse and the former indi-
vidually owned lot would be reduced to half its value, 
while the Deere Estate lot would be doubled. 
Likewise as to land suitable for subdivision but not 
yet so subdivided. Mr. Ashton would pay $7500.00 per 
acre for a 6-acre tract, but because the Deere Estate 
owned many more times that acreage, the value of its 
land by virtue of wholesale discounts and a single sale, 
etc., would be diminished to $2500.00 per acre. 
Finally, the court excluded the entire issue of sever-
ance damages, since under its ruling the w^hole of only 
two parcels was to be condemned and there was no room 
for severance damages for a partial taking as provided 
by the statute. (R. 39, 43.) 
Appellants can now answer the questions of the 
court at the hearing on the interlocutory appeal by 
stating categorically that the failure of the court belowT 
to follow the statutory provisions with respect to the 
mandatory assessment of each separate parcel and the 
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determination of severance damages in the case of partial 
takings reduced the amount of the award of damages 
by perhaps $200,000.00. 
f. Utah Cases: 
We find no Utah cases in point except by inference 
on the reverse of the facts here, the cases of Commercial 
Bank v. Madsen, supra, and Provo Eiver Water Users 
Association v. Carlson, 133 P. 2d 777, 103 Utah 93. In 
this latter case condemnee urged that by reason of his 
ownership and common use of two non-contiguous tracts, 
severance damages to the tract not condemned were in-
volved in connection with a taking of but part of a single 
parcel. However, on the facts of that case and in view 
of the non-contiguity the majority of this court reversed 
the decision of the court below, holding that two separate 
parcels were involved with a complete taking of one 
and no severance damages allowable as to the other. 
The difference between these cases, it is respectfully 
submitted, is readily apparent from a glance at the maps 
and a cursory knowledge of the supporting facts. Here 
there were many separate parcels involved. The effect 
of the court's two-parcel decision, let alone plaintiff's 
claim that all was a single parcel, was to deprive the 
owners of their right to just compensation. The rulings 
of the court, it is respectfully submitted, were in viola 
tion of the well-known due process and equal protection 
clauses of Utah's Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 22, 
24, 26 and 27, as well as a flagrant violation of Section 
103-34-10. 
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Likewise was violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution requiring payment of just 
compensation for the property taken. This has been 
held to be "the full and perfect equivalent of the property 
taken." Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed. 664. But no such 
compensation is being paid in this instance. 
Point. 
5. The court improperly eliminated the issue of sev-
erence damages. 
The issue of severance damages, as in the case of 
interest as a part of just compensation, is a matter sep-
arate and apart from that of the proper determination 
of the fair market value of the land actually taken. 
As discussed at length under Point 4, the court 
determined that the whole of each of two separate parcels 
was being condemned. Hence it ruled that under Section 
104-34-10 of the Judicial Code there was no place for 
the allowance of any severance damages. The issue was 
stricken from the pleadings by eliminating defendants' 
averments as to such severance damages set forth in 
their answer (R. 39, 41, 43), and the issue was not 
submitted to the jury (R. 102). 
Apart from the court's determination on other points 
in this appeal, it is respectfully submitted that this case 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions 
to reinstate the pleadings as to the issue of severance 
damages, and to proceed to hear and determine such 
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issue. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that under the require-
ment of the Federal and State Constitutions the just 
compensation to be paid these defendants under the 
facts of this particular case require payment of not 
only the fair market value of the property taken, but 
also interest computed at the legal rate in order to com-
pensate the owner for his damage from July 12, 1951 
when his injury occurred, until May 10, 1952 when the 
amount became payable. 
I t is further submitted that the foregoing constitu-
tional requirements as well as statutory directives have 
also been violated by reason of the outlined prejudicial 
errors committed by the trial court, resulting in depriv-
ing the owners from an award of just compensation for 
their property. Accordingly, in this respect the judg-
ments of the lower court should be reversed and a new 
trial ordered. 
C. C. PARSONS, . 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
and Defendants. 
47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
